INTRODUCTION
The Internet, which i s i n trinsically a common playground for a large number of players with varying degrees of collaborative and sel sh motives, naturally gives rise to numerous new game theoretic issues. Computational problems underlying solutions to these issues, achieving desirable economic criteria, often turn out to be NP-hard. It is therefore natural to apply notions from the area of approximation algorithms to these problems. The connection is made more meaningful by the fact that the two areas of game theory and approximation algorithms share common methodology { both heavily use machinery from the theory of linear programming. Various aspects of this connection have b e e n explored recently by researchers 8, 10, 15, 20, 21, 26, 27, 29] .
In this paper we will consider the problem of sharing the cost of a jointly utilized facility in a \fair" manner. Consider a service providing company whose set of possible customers, also called users, i s U. F or each s e t S U C (S) denotes the cost incurred by the company to serve the users in S. T h e function C is known as the cost function. F or concreteness, assume that the company broadcasts news of common interest, such as nancial news, on the net. Each u s e r , i, has a utility, u 0 i , for receiving the news. This utility u 0 i is known only to user i. User i enjoys a bene t of u 0 i ;xi if she gets the news at the price xi. If she does not get the news then her bene t is 0. Each user is assumed to be sel sh, and hence in order to maximize bene t, may misreport her utility a s some other number, say ui. F or the rest of the discussion, the utility of user i will mean the number ui.
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true value of her utility. I t i s s a i d t o b e group strategyproof if this holds for coalitions as well. A cost sharing mechanism is budget balanced if the total amount i t c harges from the receivers is same as the cost incurred by the service provider, C(S). It is e cient if it maximizes, over all subsets, S, t h e sum of the utilities of users in S minus C(S). Ideally, o n e seeks an e cient, budget balanced and group strategyproof cost sharing mechanism. A classical result in game theory 13, 28] shows that such a m e c hanism does not exist even for a submodular cost function (see Section 2 for formal definitions of these notions). Such a m e c hanism does not exist even after relaxing the condition of group strategyproofness to just strategyproofness.
In view of this limitation, there are two options: sacri ce either budget balance or e ciency. In the rst case, one can show that if the cost function is nondecreasing and submodular, then there is only one way of maximizing e ciency 24] . This is called the marginal cost mechanism. This mechanism is strategyproof, though not group strategyproof. It never creates a budget surplus but can run a de cit, and in many cases raises no revenue at all 24].
In the second case, a fundamental theorem of Moulin and Shenker 23, 24] shows that a cross-monotonic cost sharing method (also known as population monotonic allocation scheme, see Section 2 for a de nition) gives rise to a budget balance and group strategyproofness cost sharing mechanism. Moreover, if the cost function is submodular, the converse holds as well.
A nondecreasing, submodular cost function supports an entire class of cross-monotonic cost sharing methods. It is useful to characterize methods from this class possessing special properties so that the service provider may p i c k one judiciously. T w o w ell known methods are:
1 seeks to distribute the cost equally among all the receivers. Mutuswami has shown that assuming all users draw their utility v alues from the same probability d i stribution (with some technical restrictions) this method maximizes the expected size of the set served 25]. A cost sharing method is said to satisfy the coalition participation constraint if the total cost share of any subset S of the users is no more than C(S), i.e., coalition S has no incentive to break o from the grand coalition. only the users in S. Such a cost sharing method is also called weakly cross-monotone. The class of all weakly cross-monotone cost sharing methods corresponding to a given cost function is said to form the core. The classic Bondareva-Shapley Theorem states that the core is nonempty i the cost function satis es the covering property (see Section 5 for de nition). This allows us to compute an element o f -approximate core (see sections 4 and 5) .
In this paper we rst consider the problem of multicast routing. A tree T containing the source and all possible users is xed. To serve a subset S of the users, information is routed over the subtree of T containing S and the source. Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou and Shenker 8] have recently shown that the marginal cost cost-sharing mechanism can be implemented on this model with the overhead of only two messages per link, thus leading to a linear number of total message, whereas Shapley value requires a quadratic number of messages. They also show that the welfare value of an optimal subtree is NP-hard to approximate within any constant factor.
Although this model for multicast routing is widely used, it su ers from the drawback that the subtree connecting a certain subset S of receivers may be arbitrarily more costly than the cheapest tree to them. The latter of course is an optimal Steiner tree containing S and the source. Such a tree is NP-hard to compute. In addition, Megiddo 22] has shown that for this game, the core is empty and so there does not even exist a weak cross-monotonic cost sharing method for the optimal Steiner tree.
We get around these di culties by turning to approximation algorithms. A well known factor 2 approximation algorithm for Steiner tree is to nd a minimum spanning tree on the required vertices 19]. The minimum spanning tree game has been studied extensively in the literature 2, 11, 12, 17, 18, 16] . Kent a n d S k orin- Kapov 17] show h o w to construct a whole class of weak cross-monotonic methods as well as one cross-monotone method for this game. For the latter result, they use matroid properties of spanning trees. Using the primal-dual minimum spanning tree algorithm of Edmonds 6] , we show h o w to construct a class of cross-monotone methods. These methods are parameterized by n mappings, fi : R + ! R + , one for each u s e r , i. T h e service provider now h a s a c hoice of methods. For instance, he could use his estimates of the probability distribution functions of users' utilities as the mappings.
In a forthcoming paper 14] we build on the above i d e a of running a primal-dual-type algorithm and distributing costs according to n mappings for constructing a class of cross-monotonic cost sharing methods for an arbitrary nondecreasing submodular function. We also present a broader notion of egalitarianism motivated by the following: If individual users have widely varying nancial resources then the egalitarian method of Dutta and Ray does not equalize their opportunity of receiving the service. We i n troduce the notion of opportunity egalitarianism which attempts to do this. We show h o w a service provider can attempt to equalize, among the users, the opportunity of their getting the service, based on his estimate of their individual resources. The basic technique underlying our method also enables us to generalize Mutuswami's result: we give an algorithm that maximizes the expected size of the set served even if individual utilities are drawn from di erent probability distributions.
In Section 4 we point out a shortcoming of the condition of budget balance, and propose the -approximate budget balance c ondition. W e use the cost sharing methods derived for Steiner tree to give a 2-approximate budget balanced group strategyproof cost sharing mechanism for the metric TSP game (see Section 4), and leave the open problem of deriving a factor 1.5 solution, using Christofedes' algorithm. Core allocation functions for the metric and Euclidean TSP games have been given by F aigle, Fekete, Hochstattler, and Kern 7] and Fekete and Pulleyblank 9] , respectively.
Several NP-hard minimization problems admit a constant factor approximation algorithm based on an LP-relaxation that is a covering program (e.g., see 32]). In Section 5 we study general approaches for analyzing games based on such problems. We s h o w that the cost function given by an optimal solution to a covering linear program satis es the covering property (see Section 5 for de nitions). We further show that it admits an e ciently computableapproximate weakly cross-monotonic cost sharing method. Perhaps a stronger result holds { that in fact it admits a cross-monotonic cost sharing method. We l e a ve t h i s a s an (important) open problem. If this open problem is settled positively, it will lead to a general scheme for obtaining a polynomial time computable -approximate budget balanced group strategyproof cost sharing mechanism for such games. Finding such a method for the facility location game seems particularly interesting. Recently, Goemans and Skutella 10] have studied this game and have a core allocation in case the well known LP-relaxation, due to Balinski 1] , has an integral solution.
Finally, w e consider the purely combinatorial question of characterizing the space of cross-monotone methods corresponding to a given nondecreasing submodular function. We show that this is a polyhedron and characterize a subset of its corner points. We leave the open problem of characterizing the rest of the corner points.
THE MODEL
Let us describe the model in the context of multicast routing. The simplest way of broadcasting a message to many receivers is unicasting, under which the message is individually sent to each receiver. This results in several copies of the same message traversing the network links. This waste of bandwidth could be avoided by using a di erent form of routing, called multicast routing 4]. Multicast routing uses a tree connecting all the receivers to the source. The source sends one copy of the message to each neighboring vertex in the tree. These vertices further act as sources for the downstream receivers. In this manner, a source can reach m a n y receivers without sending multiple copies of a message over any link. Traditionally, a tree containing the source and all possible receivers is xed. The network is then restricted to this tree only. Whenever a message needs to be broadcast to a subset of receivers, multicast routing picks a subtree of this tree. It therefore ignores the high connectivity o ered by t o d a y's Internet. This is not desirable when the receiver set varies with the message, since the subtree to certain a subset of receivers may be arbitrarily more costly than the cheapest tree to them.
When the network is not restricted to a tree, the problem of nding the cheapest multicast tree for a given set of receivers is the well-known Steiner tree problem, which is NP-hard. Although constant factor approximation algorithms are known for the Steiner tree problem, we do not know o f a n y algorithm which gives either a nondecreasing or a submodular cost function. In fact, the optimal solution also does not give a submodular cost function. For example, consider a four cycle with unit cost edges whose vertices are three receivers and the source. The fractional optimal solution to the two w ell-known linear programming relaxations of the Steiner tree problem, undirected cut formulation and bidirected cut formulation, also does not give a submodular cost function.
Let G = ( V E) be an undirected graph with edge weights ce's and a marked node root, which is the broadcasting source. All other nodes are users. W e denote the set of all users by U. W e assume that a message can be duplicated at any node at no cost. Edge e charges the price ce for transporting a message from one end to other. The cost of broadcasting a message is the total price charged by all the edges. We assume that each edge is of in nite capacity, so, a message can be sent f r o m n o d e i to node j through the shortest path between them. Hence we assume that ce's satisfy the triangle inequality. Now, suppose that the root has a message to broadcast and every user i has reported utility ui to the root. The root's job is to come up with the following:
1. a set Q of users, selected to receive the message, 2. a tree T containing Q to broadcast the message, and 3. for each user i, the price xi, t o b e c harged as the cost of delivering the message. For notational convenience we will also represent Q by its indicator function q, i.e., qi = 1 i f i 2 Q and qi = 0 otherwise.
Now there are computational and economic constraints to be satis ed. The only computational constraint w e a r e considering in this paper is that only polynomial time is available for computation. The economic constraints are listed below:
1. Optimality. T is an optimum tree connecting all the users in Q with the root.
No Positive T ransfers (NPT). For each u s e r i, xi
0, i.e., users will not be paid for receiving a message. only those users will pay who will receive the message. Moreover, they will never be asked to pay more than their reported utilities. In other words each user has the option to not receive the message, and if so, derives a bene t of 0.
Consumer Sovereignty (CS). Every user is guaran-
teed to receive the message if she reports a high enough utility v alue.
Budget-Balance (BB).
(a) Cost Recovery P i2Q xi P e2T ce, i.e., the cost of broadcasting the message is recovered from all the users.
(b) Competitiveness P i2Q xi 6 P e2T ce, i.e., no surplus is created. Because if any surplus is created then a competitor can deliver the message at a cheaper cost by reducing the surplus. The condition of budget balance consists of satisfying both, cost recovery and competitiveness, i.e., P i2Q xi = P e2T ce (the set of users receiving the message pay exactly the total cost of T).
6. E ciency. P i2Q ui ; P e2T ce is maximized, i.e., as much w orth is created as possible. Ideally we w ant Pareto optimal, i.e., P i2Q u 0 i ; P e2T ce to be maximized. But the next condition reduces the latter to the former. Satisfying the rst condition is not computationally possible, assuming P 6 = NP. W e relax it to: the cost of T is within twice the cost of the optimum tree connecting users in Q with the root. A classical result in game theory shows that there is no strategyproof mechanisms that is both budget balance and e cient. Furthermore, Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou and Shenker have shown that it is NP-hard to compute a constant factor approximation to condition 6 as well. So, we are going to put this condition aside. Moulin and Shenker showed that all other economic constraints mentioned above can be captured by a cross-monotonic cost sharing method.
A cost function is submodular if 1. C( ) = 0 , 2. for any Q1 and Q2, C(Q1) + C(Q2) C(Q1 Q2) + C(Q1 \ Q2).
It is supermodular if the inequality in the second condition is reversed. A cost function is nondecreasing if for Q1 Q2,
C(Q1) C(Q2).
A cost allocation function f distributes the cost of sending the message to the entire set of users U, i.e., 8i 2 U f(i) 0 and P i2U f(i) = C(U). The core consists of all cost allocation functions f such t h a t 8S U P i2S f(i) C(S), i.e., no subset of the users have an incentive to secede.
A cost sharing method is a function, , which distributes the cost of broadcasting the message to the recipients. More formally, takes two arguments, a set of users Q and a user i, and returns a nonnegative real number satisfying the following:
1. if i 6 2 Q then (Q i) = 0 a n d 2. P i2Q (Q i) = C(Q), where C(Q) represents the cost of broadcasting a message to Q. Note that C(Q) i s not the optimum cost but it is the cost of the tree T computed for broadcasting the message. A cost sharing method is cross-monotonic if for Q R, (Q i) (R i) for every user i 2 Q. I t i s weakly crossmonotonic if for Q R, P i2Q (Q i) P i2Q (R i): As the name suggests, a cross-monotonic method is weakly crossmonotonic as well. Observe that a weakly cross-monotonic method provides us with a core allocation for each s u b s e t o f the users.
For every cross-monotonic cross sharing method, , Moulin and Shenker give the following mechanism M( ) w h i c h computes Q and xi = (Q i).
Mechanism M( ) 1. Q is initialized to U. 2. if there is a user i in Q with ui < (Q i) then drop i from Q. Keep repeating this step, in arbitrary order, until for every user i in Q, ui (Q i). 3. set xi = (Q i). This mechanism starts with an attempt to send message to all users, and uses to determine the cost share of each user. It drops, in arbitrary order, any user who cannot pay for receiving the message. The mechanism iterates until it a set of users who can together pay for the cost of the tree needed to serve them. Because of cross-monotonicity o f , the eventual set of users left does not depend on the order in which individual users are dropped. Since in every step at least one user is dropped, the mechanism will stop in a linear number of iteration. holds. We will show that for each i 2 C, this inequality must hold with equality, thereby showing that M( ) is group strategyproof.
In an iteration of M( ), there could be several users, i, satisfying ui < (Q i). Since is cross monotonic, thenal outcome does not depend on the manner in which a user is picked to be dropped. Each of the runs R(u 0 ) and R(u) makes these choices in an arbitrary (and uncorrelated) manner. Let s1 s 2 : : : s k be the order in which users were dropped in run R(u 0 ).
We Now, by cross monotonicity o f , the price paid by a n y member of C in the second run mu s t b e a t l e a s t t h e p r i c e paid in the rst run, i.e., 8i 2 C (Q i) (Q 0 i ). Hence, for each i 2 C, (1) must hold with equality.
THE STEINER TREE GAME
In this section, we will give a class of cost-sharing methods for multicasting that achieves budget balance and is crossmonotone, and for any set Q of users chosen for distribution, nds a tree of cost at most twice the optimal Steiner tree containing the root and users Q. Our method utilizes the following two w ell known facts.
If the edge costs satisfy the triangle inequality, t h e cost of a minimum spanning tree on the set of required vertices is within twice the cost of an optimal Steiner tree containing all required vertices. There is an exact linear programming relaxation for the minimum spanning tree problem, i.e., a relaxation that always has optimal integral solutions.
The rst fact is due to 19]. The second follows from a more general fact due to Edmonds: that there is an exact relaxation for the minimum branching problem. In this problem, we are given a directed graph with nonnegative costs on the directed edges, and one of the vertices is marked as root. The problem is to nd a minimum cost tree containing all vertices and directed into the root. The transformation from the minimum spanning tree problem in an undirected graph to the minimum branching problem is straightforward. Simply replace each undirected edge e = ( u v) o f G by t wo directed edges (u ! v) and (v ! u) e a c h o f c o s t ce, a n d ask for a minimum cost branching directed into the root. Let us denote this directed graph by H = ( V Ẽ ). Once the branching is found, we ignore directions on edges to obtain a minimum spanning tree in G.
Let us say that a set S V is valid if it is nonempty and does not contain the root. For any s e t S V and F Ẽ let (S) = f(u ! v) 2Ẽ j u 2 S and v 2 Sg, a n d F (S) = f(u ! v) 2 F j u 2 S and v 2 Sg. W e s t a t e b e l o w the LP-relaxation and dual. Say that edge e is tight if the total amount of dual it feels equals its cost. The dual program is trying to maximize the sum of the dual variables yS subject to the condition that no edge feels more dual than its cost, i.e., no edge is over-tight.
We present Edmonds' algorithm below, which i s b a s e d o n the primal-dual schema. Starting with the trivial primal and dual solutions, it iteratively improves the feasibility o f the primal and the optimality of the dual. When an edge becomes tight, it is included in the ordered list F. I n a n y iteration, a set S V is said to be unsatis ed if it is valid and F (S) = . A n y minimal unsatis ed set is said to be active. It is easy to see that active s e t s m ust be disjoint and must be strongly connected w.r.t. F.
For the purpose of proving properties of this algorithm, we will associate a notion of time with the algorithm. In unit time, the algorithm grows duals a unit amount. In an iteration, the algorithm nds all active sets, and raises their dual variables until a new edge, say e, goes tight. At t h i s point, the current iteration ends, and edge e is appended to the list F . The algorithm continues until there are no more unsatis ed sets. At this point, the algorithm prunes F using the procedure of reverse delete. The edges that remain in F form a branching directed into the root. Because the algorithm raises dual variables only for strongly connected sets, and does a reverse delete in the end, it is possible to show that every valid dual S such that yS > 0, must satisfy j F (S)j = 1. This, and the fact that only tight edges are picked lead to showing that the cost of the branching picked is precisely equal to the total dual raised, i.e., This important f a c t s h o ws that the branching found by the algorithm is optimal. As a consequence, we get that LP (2) always has an integral optimal solution. This fact will also enable us to show that our cost-sharing method is budget balanced.
Let Q be the set of recipients. We are provided with functions fi : R + ! R + , one for each user i. Use Algorithm 2 t o n d a m i n i m um spanning tree containing Q and the root.
We n o w de ne the cost-sharing method . The cost share for user i 2 Q is computed as follows. Let T denote the rst time at which there is a path from i to the root consisting of tight edges. At t i m e t T , let S(t) denote the set of vertices reachable from i using tight edges. At e a c h time t < T , the algorithm grows the dual variable y S(t) at unit rate. Let
De ne the cost share for user i,
Theorem 3. The cost-sharing method, , i s c r oss-monotonic.
Proof. Observe t h a t a t e a c h time, the cost-sharing method is simply distributing the growing dual y S(t) among the users in S(t). Since the total dual constructed equals the cost of the tree found,
Consider a run of Algorithm 2 on the set of users Q and let w = 2 Q be another user. Let i 2 Q be an arbitrary user.
Let R and R 0 be the runs of Algorithm 2 on input Q and Q f wg, respectively. Let S(t) a n d S 0 (t) b e t h e s e t s o f vertices reachable from i via tight edges at time t in runs R and R 0 , respectively. De ne
Let T and T 0 be the rst times at which there is a tight p a t h from i to the root in run R and R 0 , respectively. Then, If i can reach w in run R 0 at time t, t h e n S 0 (t) S(t), and otherwise S(t) = S 0 (t). Therefore, for all t, F 0 (t) F (t). Furthermore, i reaches the root at the same time or earlier in run R 0 than in run R, i.e., T 0 T. Hence, (Q fwg i )
For purposes of e ciency, Algorithm 2 is rst run to determine the duals grown, and for each dual, the time at which it started and stopped growing. Since the duals grown form a laminar family, their number is bounded by 2 n. This information is su cient for cost allocation. If the functions fi are simple, the cost shares can be computed in closed form otherwise, one will have to use numerical methods.
Corollary 4. For the cost sharing method given above, the mechanism M( ) is budget balanced, meets NPT, VP, CS, and is group strategyproof.
If all the functions fi are the same, we get the cost-sharing method of Kent and Skorin-Kapov. This corresponds to distributing each dual yS equally among the users in the set S.
Are all possible cross-monotone cost sharing methods for minimum spanning trees captured by the algorithm given above? We g i v e an example to show that the answer to this question is \No". Consider a network on 3 vertices, root, u and v. Let the distances be (root u) = 1 , ( u v) = 1 and (root v) = 2 . Consider the cross-monotone cost-sharing method (fug u ) = 1 , (fvg v ) = 2 , (fu vg u ) = 0 and (fu vg v ) = 2. When run with vertices u and v, our algorithm will assign a nonnegative c o s t t o v ertex u. H e n c e , i t will never generate this cost-sharing method.
RELAXING THE BUDGET BALANCE CONDITION
Clearly, the cost sharing method should be such t h a t t h e service provider does not run into a de cit. In the presence of competition, it should not create a large surplus either. Budget balance ensures both these conditions, in a mathematically clean manner. However, this is a di cult condition to ensure. Moreover, even when satis ed, it can su er from the following aw. Let us consider our Steiner tree solution. We assumed that we w ere provided with a complete graph, G, with edge costs satisfying the triangle inequality, and found a tree T in it. However, the original network, H, may not have links connecting all pairs of nodes. Graph G is obtained by taking the closure of H, so that edges in G correspond to shortest paths in H. Mapping tree T back to H involves replacing edges by paths. This gives rise to a spanning graph, say H 0 , w h i c h in general contains cycles and multiple edges. Now, budget balance requires the broadcasting company to send a message on each link of H 0 , which is clearly wasteful. Any spanning tree that is a subgraph of H 0 , s a y T 0 , su ces.
This aw and the general di culty of ensuring budget balance motivate the following de nition. Let OPT(Q) denote the optimal cost function for serving users Q and let 1 be a constant. (In general, may be a function of n { for this paper, let us assume it is a constant.) is an -approximate cost sharing method if it satis es the following:
1. -approximate Competitiveness 8Q U : P i2Q (Q i) OPT(Q), i.e., any s e t Q of users together pays at most times the optimum cost of serving Q.
2. Cost Recovery 8Q U : P i2Q (Q i) C(Q), for some feasible solution of cost C(Q), i.e., the cost incurred by the service provider is recovered from the users served. A cost sharing mechanism is -approximate budget balanced if it is -approximate competitive and cost recovering. One can easily obtain the following along the lines of Moulin and Shenker's Theorem 1.
Theorem 5. For any -approximate cross-monotonic cost sharing method , m e chanism M( ) is -approximate budget balanced, meets NPT, VP, CS and is group strategyproof. Furthermore M( ) is e ciently computable if is.
Under these de nitions, tree T 0 is a 2-approximate budget balanced solution. Let us illustrate another use of this notion. Consider the metric TSP game, i n w h i c h e d g e c o s t s between nodes satisfy the triangle inequality, a n d a t r a veling salesman starts at node 1 and executes a tour, visiting a set of users that are chosen by the cost sharing mechanism. Recall that doubling an MST, nding an Eulerian tour and short cutting gives a factor 2 approximation algorithm for metric TSP. Using this fact and Theorem 3 we get.
Theorem 6. There is a 2-approximate budget balanced group strategyproof cost sharing mechanism for the metric TSP game.
An -approximate cost allocation function f is an -approximate competitive and cost recovering way of serving the entire set of users U, i . e . , 8i 2 U f(i) 0 a n d
The -core consists of all -approximate cost allocation functions f such t h a t 8S
OPT(S). Clearly, a n -approximate weakly cross-monotonic cost sharing method yields an -approximate cost allocation function for each subset of users. A shortcoming of the notion of core is that it turns out to be empty for many games. We hope that the relaxed notion introduced above will alleviate this di culty.
Remark : In the de nition of -approximate weakly crossmonotonic cost sharing method, replacing the condition
OPT(Q) would have lead to a weaker, though still potentially useful, de nition.
A GENERAL APPROACH
Next, we present an open problem, whose positive r e s o l ution would lead to a general technique for obtaining anapproximate budget balanced group strategyproof cost sharing method for several games based on NP-hard problems.
For the time being, we can construct -approximate core allocations for these games. Let us rst present some denitions.
A fractional set, S, is a set in which a n e l e m e n t can appear partially i.e., with each element, e, there is a number fS(e) 2 0 1], which tells the extent of appearance of e in set S. T h e union of two fractional sets, S1 and S2, is denoted by S1 S2 and is de ned by the function fS 1 S 2 = minffS 1 +fS 2 1g: If S is a set and f 2 0 1] then f S is a fractional set where each element i n S appears to the extent o f f in f S. F ractional sets S1 S 2 : : : S n cover S if S1 S2 : : : Sn = S.
Suppose U is the set of all users and C : 2 U ! R + is a cost function. C is said to exhibit the covering property if for any s e t S of users and any c o vering of S of the form S = S j fj Sj, w e h a ve C(S) P j fj C(Sj), where each Sj is a set of users.
The classic Bondareva-Shapley Theorem 3, 30] shows that a necessary and su cient condition for the existence of a weakly cross-monotonic cost sharing method is that the underlying cost function exhibit the covering property.
Does a cost function satisfying the covering property a lways admit a cross-monotonic cost sharing method? A positive resolution will lead to the following general scheme.
A Consider an NP-hard minimization problem for which an factor approximation algorithm is obtained using an LP-relaxation as a lower bound, i.e., the cost of the solution found is at most times an optimal solution to the LP. F urthermore, assume that this LP, P, i s a c o vering LP, L, i n tersected with a nonnegative cone C. (In most cases C will simply be the nonnegative orthant. As shown below, for facility location, a di erent cone is required.) If our open problem resolves positively, the optimal cost function for LP P admits a cross-monotonic cost sharing method. Multiplying by gives us an -approximate budget balanced group strategyproof cost sharing mechanism.
Using Lemma 7 and the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem 3, 30] one can show that there exists an -approximate weakly cross monotonic cost sharing method for . However, their theorem uses an exponential sized LP which m a y b e s o l vable in polynomial time in particular cases, though not in general. The following theorem gives a way of nding one such method e ciently. Theorem 8. There is an e ciently computable -approximate weakly cross-monotonic cost sharing method for .
Proof. We m a y assume w.l.o.g. that there is a unique inequality i n L corresponding to each user and that the constant in this inequality is 1. The latter is easily ensured by scaling. Suppose the former is not satis ed for user i. Consider the inequalities corresponding to user i. P i c k a n e w variable xi and replace each inequality This cost sharing method is -approximate competitive because P i2Q (Q i) = OPTf(Q) OPT(Q). It satis es cost recovery because the cost of the solution produced by the factor approximation algorithm for is C(Q) OPTf(Q) = P i2Q (Q i). Finally, let us show that it satis es weak cross-monotonicity. Let Q R. L e t y R be an optimal solution to LP DR. Let y 0 denote the restriction of y R to coordinates corresponding to users in Q. The important o b s e r v ation is that y 0 is a feasible solution to DQ. Since the optimal solution to DQ can have only a higher objective function value, weak cross-monotonicity f o l l o ws. L e t u s s h o w h o w Lemma 7 helps overcome some of the di culties in obtaining a group strategyproof cost sharing method for the facility location game. In this game, we a r e given a set of cities and a set of potential sites for opening facilities. For each site, we are given the cost of opening a facility there. For each city and site we are given the cost of connecting the city to a facility opened at that site. These connection costs satisfy the triangle inequality. I n t h i s setting cities are users who want themselves to be connected to an open facility. Each user reports a utility for being connected to an open facility. The cost of serving a set of users is the total cost of opening facilities and connecting each c i t y in the set to one of the open facilities.
One di culty is that the optimal solution does not admit a w eakly cross-monotonic cost sharing method (and hence no cross-monotonic method either). The reason is that the optimal cost function does not exhibit the covering property. For an instance, consider a cycle on 6 vertices, with 3 cities and 3 facilities alternating. The cost of each edge is 1 and the cost of opening each facility i s 2 .
A w ell known LP-relaxation for this problem, due to Balinski 1], is given below. Several constant factor approximation algorithms are based on this relaxation. Suppose C is the set of cities and F is the set of facilities. Suppose fi is the cost of opening facility i and cij is the cost of connecting city j to facility i. In the corresponding integer program, yi is a 0=1 v ariable which is 1 i facility i is open, and xij be a 0 =1 v ariable which i s 1 i c i t y j is connected to facility i. C Therefore, by Lemma 7, the optimal solution to Balinski's LP satis es the covering property. This opens the possibility of nding a constant factor approximate budget balanced and group strategyproof method for the facility location game.
CHARACTERIZING CROSS-MONOTONIC METHODS
Let C be a nondecreasing submodular cost function over the user set U = f1 2 : : : n g. In this section we will study the space of all cross-monotone cost-sharing methods for C as well as the smallest and largest cost shares allocated by such methods to a speci c user in a speci c coalition. We rst de ne some special cost sharing methods. Let be a permutation on 1 : : : n . T h e incremental cost sharing method is de ned as follows. Let S U. Assume jSj = k, and let i1 : : : i k be the users in S, ordered according to . The cost shares assigned to these users by are: (S i1) = C(i1), and for 2 j k, (S ij) = C(fi1 : : : i j g) ; C(fi1 : : : i j;1g). Proposition 9. Let S U and i 2 S. A mong all crossmonotone cost-sharing m e t h o ds for C, max (S i) = C(i) and min (S i) = C(S) ; C(S ; f ig):
Proof. By the cross-monotonicity o f , max (S i) C(i). Furthermore, this value is attained for the incremental cost-sharing method based on any permutation such that (1) = i.
Applying cross-monotonicity t o S ; f ig, w e get that min (S i) C(S) ; C(S ; f ig):
This value is attained for the incremental cost-sharing method based on any p e r m utation such that (n) = i. This leads to the following question regarding the minimum spanning tree game: what is the complexity of computing the minimum and maximum, over all cross-monotone cost-sharing methods, of the cost-share of an individual user in a given coalition? This problem appears to be NP-hard.
Let be a cross-monotone cost-sharing method for C. Represent as a point i n n2 n;1 dimensional real space whose coordinates are indexed by pairs (Q i), where Q U and i 2 Q. Consider in this space the set of all crossmonotone cost-sharing methods for C. This set is a polytope, since it can be described by the following linear system on n2 Observe that the cost function of this example is particularly simple: it assigns costs to sets based only on their cardinality. Let us call such a cost function a cardinality cost function.
We leave the open problem of characterizing the rest of the corner points of this polytope. The special case of a cardinality cost function is also interesting.
